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Abstract
We provide a theoretical framework to contribute to the current debate regarding
the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing
products that are follow-ondrugs of already existing drugs, rather than toward
the development of breakthrough drugs. We construct a model with a population of
patients who can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically di¤eren-
tiated. In addition to a pioneering drug, a new drug can be marketed as the result
of an innovative process. We analyze physician prescription choices and the optimal
pricing decision of an innovative rm. We also characterize the incentives of the in-
novative rm to conduct R&D activities, disentangling the quest for breakthrough
drugs from the rm e¤ort to develop follow-on drugs. Our results o¤er theoretical
support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical rms devote too many
resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations.
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that of all the industrial sectors, the pharmaceutical industry is
the sector that traditionally invests most heavily in research and development (R&D). In
2012, for instance, US biopharmaceutical research companies invested an estimated $48.5
billion in R&D (PhRMA, 2013). Regarding R&D intensity, and according to a recent
report by the European Commission, spending on R&D in 2012 by the pharmaceutical
industry amounted to 15.3% of its GDP in the US, 16.3% in Japan, and to 14.7% in the
European Union (European Commission, 2013).
However, there is a great deal of debate surrounding pharmaceutical R&D activities.
Pharmaceutical companies are often accused of devoting too many resources to the mar-
keting of apparent new products that are follow-on drugs of already existing drugs,
rather than toward the development of breakthrough (rst-in-class) drugs.1 In fact, a
successful new rst-in-class drug will often face competition from a series of follow-on
drugs that are therapeutically similar to the pioneering drug. The angiotensin converting
enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, a class of drugs used to manage high blood pressure, is illustra-
tive of this. The rst ACE inhibitor, captopril, was introduced in the US in 1981. Since
then over 10 ACE inhibitors have been launched (Hernandez and Harrington, 2008).2
The development of follow-on drugs is cheaper and less risky than drugs with a novel
mechanism of action, but they supposedly do not bring signicant therapeutic progress
to patients (see, for instance, the discussions by Angell, 2004; Avorn, 2004; and Goozner,
2004). Defenders of incremental innovations argue, however, that medicines based on
incremental improvements often represent advances in safety and e¢ cacy, along with pro-
viding new formulations and dosing options that increase patient compliance (see diMasi
and Paquette, 2004; Wertheimer and Santella, 2009; and the article by Doctor Henry I.
Miller in the Wall Street Journal on January 1, 2014).
This paper aims at contributing to this social debate. We build a theoretical model
of innovation to investigate whether there exist arguments that allow us to support the
conviction that pharmaceutical rms devote too many resources to marketing me-too
drugs and too few to launching breakthrough drugs. Our model emphasizes the distinction
between radical and incremental innovation processes.3 Radical innovation processes may
1Follow-on drugs are sometimes called me-toodrugs as they are close copies of existing drugs.
2Another example is omeprazole, the rst proton pump inhibitor launched in 1989 to reduce gastric
acid production. Proton pump inhibitors have since become the mainstay of treatment for acid-related
gastrointestinal disease in adults, and omeprazole was followed by other proton pump inhibitors, with
the most recent launched in 2009.
3The labels radicaland incrementalbelong mostly to the managerial literature and does not o¤er
a unique description of the di¤erence between the two concepts. In fact, the literature reveals that the
denitions of radical and incremental innovations are still puzzling, both at the theoretical and at the
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lead to breakthrough drugs, while incremental innovation processes pursue me-too drugs.
In our model there is a continuum of patients in need of medical treatment. Patients
can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated. Vertical
di¤erentiation refers to the quality of the drug and includes the health gains experienced
by patients. Horizontal di¤erentiation reects the adequacy of the drug for patients, as
di¤erent patients in the population will experience di¤erent e¤ects of a given medication
in terms of tolerability, side e¤ects or interaction with other medicines. In the market,
there is a pioneering drug. We assume that the price of this drug is xed, for example,
because the patent protection that covered it has already expired and the drug is sold at its
marginal cost. Moreover, a new drug can be marketed as the result of an innovative process
by a pharmaceutical rm that seeks to achieve an improvement over the existing medicine.
Finally, there is a physician who makes drug prescription decisions. The physician acts
as a perfect agent for the health system (which includes both patients and the health
authority) and, hence, he makes prescription choices based on the price-e¤ectiveness of
the drugs.
In this simple set-up we rst describe physician prescription choices, given the prices
and the characteristics of the two drugs (when the innovation process is successful). Sec-
ond, we characterize the optimal pricing decision of the innovative rm, which anticipates
the physician prescription behavior. The optimal price for the new drug depends on the
di¤erences in cost-e¤ectiveness and the horizontal distance between the new drug and the
pioneer. When the new drug is much more cost-e¤ective than the pioneer, the innovative
rm sets a price that leads the physician to prescribe the new drug to all patients. When
the improvements in the cost-e¤ectiveness of the new drug are not substantial, or the two
drugs are very horizontally di¤erentiated, then the price set by the innovative rm leads
to a drug replacement treatment only for some patients. In all other situations the new
drug is not marketed.
Finally, we characterize the incentives of the innovative rm to conduct R&D activities
and compare these private incentives with those that would be optimal from a social
point of view. The paper distinguishes between radical innovation processes, seeking
breakthrough drugs, and incremental innovation processes that aim at launching a me-
too drug. In order to di¤erentiate these two kinds of innovations, we follow the approach
of measuring the degree of innovativeness of a drug as the size of the di¤erences (either
small or large) between the new drug and the pioneer. These di¤erences can emerge
either in the horizontal or the vertical characteristics of the drugs. Innovations in the
empirical level (see García and Calantone, 2002, for a critical review of the innovativeness terminology).
In particular, the degree of innovativeness of a product is measured using various dimensions including
the level of risk implied in the innovation strategy, the type of knowledge to be processed or the level of
investment needed to move onto a new trajectory.
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vertical dimension imply a better quality of treatment (or a lower production cost) for all
the patients su¤ering from the disease.4 Horizontal innovations would be advances that
benet some but not all patients because drugs may have lower side e¤ects for a certain
group of patients.5 Moreover, in order to account for the fact that the level of risk (or
uncertainty of the nal outcome) is typically larger in the case of radical innovations, we
consider that the outcome of a radical innovation process by the innovative rm takes
values on a large support and has a greater variance.
The paper provides some interesting ndings. We show that for incremental innova-
tion processes pursuing me-too drugs, the social value of the innovation coincides with
the private benets of the rm (as the innovative rm appropriates all the health sys-
tem benets derived from the launching of the me-too drug). If we consider, instead,
R&D activities searching for breakthrough drugs, then private and social incentives for
conducting research are not aligned. In particular, the incentives for conducting research
by the rm are inferior to those socially optimal as there are patients that -despite the
larger price of the new drug- benet from it. These results allow us to show that if a
pharmaceutical company can only adopt one of the two types of innovation processes
due, for instance, to budget constraints, it may happen that the rm has an incentive to
seek a me-too drug although R&D activities oriented to search for a radical innovation
are socially superior. At the same time, it never happens that the innovative rm prefers
to develop a radical innovation when devoting the resources to incremental innovations is
preferable from a social point of view. Our results thus o¤er theoretical support for the
conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical rms devote too many resources to conducting
R&D activities that lead to me-too drugs.
The theoretical literature on incentives for pharmaceutical innovations is not abun-
dant, although there is an increasing number of papers that study the interaction between
the pricing policy constrained by various forms of regulation and the e¤ort of innovation
4Examples of innovations that would be classied as vertical in our model would include the afore-
mentioned captopril (ACE-inhibitor) and omeprazole (protone pump inhibitor), and also cimetidine
(H2-receptor antagonist), propranolol (ß-adrenoceptor antagonist), lovastatin (HMG-CoA-reductase in-
hibitor), and sumatriptane (5-HT1B/1D-receptor agonist) among others. All these are drugs that, when
marketed, met a given need much more e¤ectively than available treatments and were benecial for all
patients in the treatment of their disease. Also, innovations in antibiotics that allow administration
once a day, giving patients the possibility of being treated at home, or at least the possibility to reduce
hospitalization time, are vertical innovations according to our classication. Finally, second-generation
antihistamines have some (vertical) improvements over rst-generation antihistamines like, for instance,
less frequent dosing.
5For example, in the market for statins, Lovastatin, pravastatin, and uvastatin represent the class
members with the lowest potency to reduce cholesterol levels but which are attractive candidates for use
in treating patients who have proven intolerant of more potent statins such as atorvastatin, simvastatin
or rosuvastatin (Kapur and Musunuru, 2008).
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by pharmaceutical rms. Ganuza, Llobet, and Domínguez (2009) nd a bias in the phar-
maceutical industry toward small innovations. Their result relies on the low sensitivity
of a part of the demand (due to the loyalty of some physicians) to changes in prices.
This lack of price-sensitivity provides an excessive reward for small innovations and con-
sequently downwardly distorts the incentives of pharmaceutical rms. In our model, the
physician acts as a perfect agent for the health system, so that the di¤erence between the
social value and the private benets that the rm obtains from innovation arises from a
di¤erent source: the ability of the pharmaceutical rm to appropriate or not the health
system surplus through the price. The existence of physicians that are loyal to innovative
drugs also plays an important role in Antoñanzas, Juárez-Castelló, and Rodríguez-Ibeas
(2011). They study the incentives of an incumbent pharmaceutical rm to launch an up-
graded drug through innovation before it faces generic competition. The paper shows that
the equilibrium level of innovation exhibits an inverted U shape, as innovation increases
when the proportion of loyal physicians is low and decreases when it is high. Finally,
Bardey, Bommier, and Jullien (2010) focus on the long-run impact of reference pricing on
pharmaceutical innovation by rms. Their model shares some similarities with ours as it
makes a clear distinction between incremental and radical innovations in a setting where
drugs are horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated. However, the distinction they make
between the two types of innovations di¤ers notably from ours. In addition to this, they
model a patent race where the innovative process is deterministic and competition in R&D
leads to the dissipation of rmsprots. They show that the short-term and long-term
e¤ects of price regulation may be antagonists. In their simulation using French data, they
nd that favoring radical innovation processes at the expense of cost-reducing innovations
may generate medium/long-run increases in health expenses, despite potential short-run
benets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents our
model. Section 3 studies prescription decisions by the physician. Section 4 analyzes
pricing decisions by the innovative rm and characterizes the market equilibrium. In
section 5 we discuss the benet to the health system derived from the launch of the new
drug. Section 6 discusses private versus social incentives to innovate. Section 7 proposes
a simple model of innovation. Section 8 discusses the robustnesss of the results when
the physician acts as a perfect agent for the patient. Finally, the last section o¤ers some
concluding remarks. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
5
2 The Model
There is a continuum of patients in need of medical treatment. We normalize the size of
the population of patients to 1: Patients su¤er from the same illness and are identied
by a horizontal characteristic x; with x distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1] : The
parameter x represents the type of the patient and measures the heterogeneity regarding
the patient genotype or any other characteristic that may induce the disease to have
di¤erent e¤ects among patients.
Patients can be treated with a drug. We consider that drugs are both horizontally
and vertically di¤erentiated. Thus, a drug is dened by a pair of characteristics: (x^; h^):
The rst characteristic x^ 2 [0; 1] captures the horizontal di¤erentiation and reects the
adequacy of the drug for di¤erent patients. It is widely recognized that di¤erent patients in
a population experience di¤erent e¤ects of a given medication in terms of tolerability, side
e¤ects or interaction with other medicines.6 In our model, where patients are distributed
along the interval [0; 1], a particular location (type) of a patient reects the patients ideal
drug. That is, a drug with characteristic x^ has the ideal type for a patient located at x^.
Those patients who fail to obtain a drug of their ideal type face a cost, and the farther
patient type x from x^ is, the lower the benets he enjoys (or the larger the side e¤ects he
su¤ers) when he is exposed to the drug.7
The second characteristic of the drug incorporates the vertical di¤erentiation and it
refers to the gross e¤ectiveness h^ of the drug. This is a quality dimension that a¤ects the
whole population and it includes the health gains experienced by patients (which may
comprise either one or both quality and quantity of life). We assume h^ > 0; where h^ = 0
would mean that the drug has the same e¤ect as no treatment, and the higher the h^ the
better the drug for all the patients.8
In order to determine the health gain of a type-x patient treated with drug (x^; h^); we
need to consider both dimensions together. The health gain of a patient of type x when
drug (x^; h^) is prescribed is b

h^  l jx^  xj

, where jx^  xj is the distance between the
6For example, in the pharmaceutical market for blood pressure control, the drugs available to treat
hypertension may act via the central nervous system, the heart (beta blockers), the kidney (diuretics,
saluretics) or the vessels (alpha blockers, ACE inhibitors, AT1 and calcium antagonists). The e¢ cacy
and side e¤ects of these medicines di¤er across patients and, hence, a¤ect physician prescription patterns.
7There is no drug that unambiguously dominates another on the horizontal dimension, as patients
with a di¤erent x react di¤erently to a drug x^: If two drugs with a di¤erent x^ are available, there are
patients that benet more from one of the drugs, while others would be better o¤ when treated with the
other.
8In Bardey et al. (2010) drugs are also vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated, although their vertical
characteristic is binary while ours is a continuous variable (which allows us to consider small and large
di¤erences in the vertical dimension).
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horizontal characteristic of the drug and the type of the patient, l > 0 scales the loss of
e¤ectiveness or the extent of side e¤ects and b is the marginal utility of being healthy.
If we denote by p^ the price of drug (x^; h^), the benet to the health system of treating
patient x with drug (x^; h^) and paying price p^ for this drug is
H(x; x^; h^; p^) = b

h^  l jx^  xj

  p^:
We assume that there is a pre-existing drug (x0; h0), x0 2 (0; 1), on the market. The
price p0 of this pioneering drug is exogenously xed and does not react to the launch of
a new medicine. In markets where drug (x0; h0) is produced by a number of rms, this
assumption can be easily justied on the grounds that the exclusivity of the pioneering
drug has already expired and a generic drug has entered the market.9 Without loss of
generality, we assume that p0 = c0, being c0 the marginal cost of providing the drug. For
simplicity, we assume that all patients benet from the pioneering drug, that is, the whole
market is initially covered by that drug.10
There is a pharmaceutical rm (that we call rm 1), di¤erent from the one selling
(x0; h0) ; that can undertake an innovation process.11 This process is uncertain both be-
cause it may or may not lead to a new drug and because the characteristics of the potential
new drug are ex-ante random. If rm 1 adopts an innovation process and the process is
successful then a new drug is discovered. We denote by (x1; h1) the characteristics of the
new drug that will be marketed and by c1 its marginal cost. This drug may use the same
active principle as the pioneering drug or it may use a di¤erent one. What is relevant in
our model is the location of the drug in the space of horizontal and vertical characteristics.
We assume that the rm producing the new drug freely chooses the price p1:
To identify the di¤erences between the new drug and the pioneer, we dene
x 
x1   x0 ;
h  h1   h0;
c  c1   c0:
That is, x 2 R+ is the distance between the types of the drugs. Similarly, h 2
R indicates the di¤erence in quality between the two drugs, and c 2 R denotes the
9In the US, the generic share of prescriptions rose from 19% in 1984 to 78% in 2010 (Berndt and
Aitken, 2011). There is evidence that once generic drugs enter the market, both the price and sales
revenue of pioneering drugs tend to drop by about 80% over the next year (Yin, 2012).
10This hypothesis requires that b
 
h0   l x0   x   c0  0 for all x 2 [0; 1], that is, c0 
Min

b
 
h0   l  1  x0 ; b  h0   lx0	.
11For simplicity in the exposition, we have adopted the view of an entrant in the pharmaceutical market
launching a new drug. All our analysis would remain valid if, alternatively, we had assumed that there
were several rms producing the pioneering drug and that one of them could undertake the innovation
process, as in Ganuza et al. (2009).
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di¤erence in marginal costs (the new drug may be more expensive or cheaper to produce
than the pioneer).
Finally, there is a physician who makes drug prescription decisions. We assume that
the physician acts as a perfect agent for the health system, which includes both the
patients utility and the cost incurred by the health authority. Hence, the physician
assigns the medication to patients based on the price-e¤ectiveness of the two drugs.12
Notice that, given the physician behavior, whether the patients bear a copayment or the
drug is fully reimbursed by the health authority, there is no di¤erence implied in the
results since the physician takes into account the true cost of the drugs (paid either by
the patients or the health authority).13
The timing of our game is as follows. In the rst stage, rm 1 decides its innovation
strategy. In case the innovation process succeeds, the characteristics (x1; h1) as well as
the marginal cost c1 of the new drug are known. In the second stage, the innovative rm
sets the price p1 it charges. Finally, in the third stage, provided the new drug is marketed,
the physician allocates the drugs to patients (if only the pioneering drug is available, the
physician will prescribe it to all the patients). As usual, we solve the game by backward
induction.
3 Prescription of Drugs
We now analyze the last stage of the game if a new drug with characteristics (x1; h1)
has been marketed at a price p1. At this stage of the game, the physician decides which
patients are prescribed the pioneering drug (x0; h0) and which ones the new one (x1; h1).
The physician takes into account both the expected e¤ectiveness of the drugs and their
price. If both drugs provide identical benets to the health system when treating a patient,
we adopt the convention that the physician prescribes the new drug.
Following the physicians decision, the market will be split between the new drug and
the pioneer. Depending on both drugscharacteristics, as well as the price p1 decided by
the innovative rm, three di¤erent scenarios may arise. We illustrate them in Figure 1.
First, the physician prescribes the pioneering drug to all patients if the price p1 of
the new drug is very high when compared to its health benets . We denote pmax the
price above which no patient is prescribed the new drug (that happens even when pa-
12This assumption allows us to focus on rm incentives to pharmaceutical innovation, leaving aside
any distortion caused by the potential strategic behavior of agents as a consequence of the di¤erent views
they share.
13In section 8 we discuss the robustness of the analysis in a model where the physician only takes
into account the patientsutility. In that model, the reimbursement policy has an inuence not only on
physician prescription choices but also on the pricing and innovation decisions by the rm.
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Hb(h0 - l÷x - x0÷) - c0
0
0 1
x
x0 x1
if p1 > pmax
if p1 Î (pall, pmax)
if p1 < pall
b(h1 - l÷x - x1÷) - p1
b(h1 - l÷x - x1÷) - p1
b(h1 - l÷x - x1÷) - p1
Figure 1: Benets of the health system with the two drugs and split of the market as a
function of p1, c0, (x0; h0), and (x1; h1).
tient x1 is not treated with (x1; h1) if p1 > pmax). Formally, pmax is characterized by
H(x1;x1; h1; pmax) = H(x1;x0; h0; c0); or b (h1   l jx1   x1j)  pmax = b (h0   l jx1   x0j) 
c0; which implies
pmax  c0 + b(h + lx):
If p1 = pmax, the market for the new drug is 1  x1 if x1 > x0; it is x1 if x1 < x0; and
it is the whole market if x1 = x0 (the rest of the patients are prescribed the old drug).
Note that pmax is increasing in b, l, x, h, and c0. Therefore, for a given p1, it is more
likely that the old drug will keep all the market if health has a low marginal value (b low),
the disparities in the side e¤ects of the drug for di¤erent patients are small (l low), the
di¤erence between the two drugs is also small (h and x are low), and/or the pioneering
drug is very cheap to produce.
Second, the physician prescribes the new drug to all patients if the price p1 is low
enough. This is the case if p1 is so low that it is optimal to treat patient x0 with the
new drug. The cut-o¤ value pall below which all patients are treated with (x1; h1) is
characterized by b (h1   l jx1   x0j)  pall = b (h0   l jx0   x0j)  c0; that is,
pall  c0 + b(h   lx):
Given the expression of pall, a given p1 is more likely to be lower than pall for large
values of c0, b, and h, and for low values of l and x (i.e., when the di¤erence between
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the patient who prots more from each drug is low). We note that pall = pmax if x1 = x0:
Finally, the physician prescribes each drug to a subset of the patients for p1 2 
pall; pmax

. To identify the market for each drug, consider rst the case where x1 > x0.
The two drugs provide the same benets to a patient of type ~x 2 (x0; x1) if b (h0   l (~x  x0)) 
c0 = b (h1   l (x1   ~x))  p1. That is, the type of the indi¤erent patient is
~x  x0 + (lx  h)
2l
+
(p1   c0)
2bl
:
The physician prescribes treatment (x0; h0) at a price c0 to those patients whose type lies
in the interval [0; ~x); whereas patients with a type in the interval [~x; 1] are treated with
(x1; h1) at a price p1:
Similarly, for p1 2  pall; pmax and x1 < x0 the indi¤erent patient is
~x  x0   (lx  h)
2l
  (p
1   c0)
2bl
and the markets for the new drug and the pioneer are [0; ~x] and (~x; 1], respectively.
4 The Optimal Pricing Policy
In this section we study the optimal price decision of rm 1 if, as a result of the innovation
process, a new drug with characteristics (x1; h1) has been achieved.
Firm 1s incentive to price high or low depends on the drug di¤erences in terms of
vertical characteristics (both in quality, measured by h; and in marginal cost, measured
byc), and horizontal characteristics (measured by the distance in typex). The strength
of the incentives also depends on the size of the submarket (the subset of patients) in which
the innovative rm more directly competes with the pioneering drug. If x1 is on the right
of x0 (i.e., x1 > x0), then the competition is ercer on the right of x0 than on the left of
x0. That is, the size of the submarket in which rm 1 directly challenges the pioneering
drug is 1 x0. Similarly, if x1 < x0, the competition is more intense to the left of x0, that
is, in a submarket of size x0. We denote by M the size of this submarket: M  1  x0 if
x1 > x0 and M  x0 if x1 < x0. We also denote M  1 if x1 = x0 (although M does not
play any role when x = 0).
Proposition 1 summarizes the price decision of the pharmaceutical rm. Except for
the region of parameters where there is no room for the rm to make prots, the new
drug is always o¤ered at a price in the interval

pall; pmax

: For convenience, we dene
pint  1
2
 
c0 + c1

+ blM   1
2
b(lx  h);
the candidate price for an interior solution.
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In Proposition 1, we also use the function g(x), which is dened as follows:
g(x)  x + 2

2 M   2p1 M

if x >
p
1 M   (1 M)
 (1 +M  x)
(1 M +x)x otherwise.
The function g(x) is increasing, continuously di¤erentiable and fullls g(x = 0) = 0.
Finally, as h and c have similar e¤ects and as they often appear together in the
mathematical expressions, we denote the composite e¤ect of these two vertical variables
as
y  h   1
b
c:
The parameter y can be interpreted as a measure of the di¤erences in cost-e¤ectiveness
between the new drug and the pioneering one. The larger the value of y the more
cost-e¤ective the new drug is compared to the pioneer.
Proposition 1 The optimal price decision p1 of rm 1 and its prots 1(p1) are as
follows:
Region a: If y   lx then the new drug is not prescribed: p1 = c1 and 1(c1) = 0.
Region b: If y 2 ( lx; lg (x)) then the new drug replaces the pioneer for a subset
of patients. If in addition
Region b.i: M  1
2l
(y + 3lx) then p1 = pmax and
1(pmax) = b (M  x) (y + lx) :
Region b.ii: M < 1
2l
(y + 3lx) then p1 = pint and
1(pint) =
b
2l

lM +
1
2
(y   lx)
2
:
Region c: If y  lg (x) then the new drug takes over the entire market: p1 = pall;
and
1(pall) = b(y   lx):
The optimal prot function 1 is continuous in x;h, and c:
We now o¤er some intuitions for Proposition 1. When di¤erences in the cost-e¤ectiveness
between the new drug and the pioneer are very negative, that is, for low values of y,
there is no price above the marginal cost under which rm 1 can sell its drug. More
11
xh
10 x0
Reg c
p1* = pall
h0
Reg b.ii
p1* = pint
b.i
pmax
Reg b.i
p1* = pmax
b.ii
pint
Reg a
p1* = c1
Figure 2: Optimal pricing policy by rm 1 in the drug space (x; h) when c1 = c0:
precisely, in Region a, where the aggregatedi¤erence y + lx between the two drugs
is not positive, rm 1 makes zero prot.
On the contrary, in Region c the cost-e¤ectiveness of the new drug far outperforms
that of the pioneer and rm 1 decides to set a price for which the new drug is prescribed
to all patients. In this case, the price that allows the rm to serve the entire market pall
is large enough so that for the rm it is worth setting pall instead of increasing the price
further and losing some patients.
Finally, for intermediate values of y (Region b, which only exists if x > 0), the
optimal price decision by rm 1 depends on the size of submarket M . If M is su¢ ciently
large, then rm 1 sets the maximum price compatible with selling the drug pmax because
the number of patients that are treated with the new drug under this price is fairly large.
In contrast, for low values of M; rm 1 would sell the drug to too few patients at pmax
and, therefore, it prefers to cut the price and it sets pint.
Figure 2 represents the optimal pricing policy by the innovative rm for every combi-
nation of (x1; h1) ; for a given value of c; b and l: The gure is drawn for c = 0: For
a positive (resp. negative) c, all the gure would move upwards (resp. downwards) in
a proportion 1
b
c. Figure 2 is not symmetric with respect to the vertical x0 because, in
this example, x0 6= 1
2
:
It is worth noticing that although the optimal price decision p1 of rm 1 is continuously
increasing in the quality of the drug (i.e., iny) inside each region, it is neither continuous
nor increasing wheny moves from Region b to Region c. At the border of the two regions,
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where y = lg (x), pmax > pall (in Region b.i) and pint > pall (in Region b.ii). Therefore,
the price p1 decreases from either pmax or pint to pall if a marginal increase in h moves
the drug from Region b to Region c. On the other hand, the price p1 is continuous in y
(and in x) at the border of the Region b.i and Region b.ii. Finally, the optimal price
p1 increases with the horizontal di¤erentiation x in Region b.i, but decreases with x
in Region b.ii and Region c.
Corollary 1 provides some comparative statics of rm 1s prots with respect to the
level of di¤erentiation between the two drugs, x and h: We will use these expressions
in section 6 and subsection 7.3 where we compare the private and social incentives to
develop a new drug.
Corollary 1 The comparative statics of rm 1s prots are as follows:
Region b.i: 1 is increasing and linear in y. It is a concave function in x; increasing
up to x = 12l (lM  y) and decreasing afterwards.
Region b.ii: 1 is increasing and convex in y and it is decreasing and convex in x:
Region c: 1 is increasing and linear in y and it is decreasing and linear in x:
Corollary 1 shows that the prots of the innovative rm are always larger the more
cost-e¤ective the new drug is -that is, the larger the di¤erence h1 h0 and/or the smaller
the di¤erence c1  c0. Regarding the horizontal characteristic of the drug, rm 1s prots
are decreasing in x; except in Region b.i, where they are increasing for low values of
x:
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5 Benet to the Health System
The launch of the new drug a¤ects the benet of the health system. We now move to
discuss the health system surplus in the di¤erent price regions.
Recall that in our model the doctor is a perfect agent for the health system. Therefore,
he only prescribes the new drug when the surplus of the health system is higher than,
or equal to, the surplus obtained using the pioneer drug. We denote by CS the gain
14An increase in the horizontal di¤erentiation between the two drugs has two opposite e¤ects on the
prots of rm 1. On the one hand, for a given price, the market share of rm 1 decreases because more
patients prefer the pioneering drug, which has a negative impact on the prots of the rm. On the other
hand, a larger di¤erentiation allows the rm to increase the price, which may have a positive impact on
its prots. In relative terms, the positive e¤ect of the price is less and less important as the demand for
the new drug decreases, that is, as the horizontal di¤erentiation increases. In our model, the positive
e¤ect only outweighs the negative one when x is small.
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in patient health, net of the price, as a consequence of the launch of the new drug.
Proposition 2 provides the expressions for CS in the regions identied in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Given the optimal pricing policy p1 of rm 1; the variation of the health
system surplus CS due to the launch of the new drug is:
Region a: CS(c1) = 0.
Region b.i: CS(pmax) = 0:
Region b.ii: CS(pint) = b
16l
(y + 3lx   2lM) (y   5lx + 6lM) :
Region c: CS(pall) = blx (2M  x).
Some interesting insights can be extracted from Proposition 2. In the scenario where
the new drug is sold at pmax (Region b.i), total surplus is the same before and after the
launch of the new drug. The reason is that the rm charges the largest potential price,
pmax; and it therefore extracts all the surplus from the patients that in equilibrium are
prescribed the new drug. In contrast, in Region b.ii, the rm decides to charge pint < pmax
to attract some new patients and, thus, the health system surplus increases when the new
drug is marketed. Finally, in the scenario where drug 1 takes over the market (Region c)
the health system also benets from the launch of the new drug when x > 0. In this
case, the health advantages of the new drug outweighs the larger price charged by the
innovative rm, so that the health system ends up strictly better o¤.
We also provide some comparative statics of the health system surplus with respect
to the level of di¤erentiation of the two drugs, x and y:
Corollary 2 The comparative statics of the health system surplus are as follows:
Regions a and b.i: CS does not change with y or x:
Region b.ii: CS is increasing in y: It is increasing up to x = 115l (14lM  y) and
then decreasing in x.
Region c: CS is independent of y and it is increasing in x:
Moreover, CS is continuous at the border between Region b.i and Region b.ii but it
discontinuously increases when y increases (or x decreases) and the drug moves
from Region b to Region c.
Corollary 2 shows that the gains derived by the health system from the launch of the
new drug depend on the cost-e¤ectiveness of this drug as compared to the pioneering
drug (i.e., on y) only in Region b.ii. In this region, the higher the cost-e¤ectiveness
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(either due to advantages in quality or costs) of the new drug, the higher the gain in the
surplus. In the other regions, a larger cost-e¤ectiveness of the drug is fully translated
into a higher price. Notice that health system surplus is certainly more sensitive to the
horizontal characteristic x. In particular, it tends to be increasing in x; except in the
region where the new drug replaces the pioneer for some patients (Region b.ii), where the
health system surplus is decreasing for high values of x. As x increases, the innovative
rm cannot appropriate all the surplus through a higher price because its market would
be too reduced.
6 Private versus Social Incentives
Before analyzing the innovation stage (in section 7), we briey discuss here the di¤erence
in incentives for R&D between the innovative rm and a social planner who takes into
account the sum of the health system surplus and the rms benets.
R&D incentives in our model come from the benets that the parties involved derive
from the launching of the potential new drug. To discuss the di¤erence between private
and social R&D incentives, it is worth noting that the innovative rm and the health
system have di¤erent preferences regarding the characteristics of their best drug, given
the pioneering drug on the market. Figure 3 represents the comparative statics of rm 1s
prots and health system surplus with respect to vertical and horizontal changes in the
new drug as compared to the pioneer (corollaries 1 and 2).15 In general, the rm cares a
great deal about increasing the quality of the drug, either through a more e¤ective or a less
costly drug, whereas the health system (as it takes the price into account) only benets
from the launching of a better-quality drug if such a drug is well-suited to those patients
far from x0 (Region b.ii). Additionally, the prots of the innovative rm decrease with the
degree of horizontal di¤erentiation between the two drugs, except when the di¤erentiation
is small and the quality of the two drugs is similar (the left-hand part of Region b.i). On
the contrary, the health system always benets if new drugs focus on patients for whom
the e¤ectiveness of the old drug is low.
Figure 3 helps us to better understand the di¤erence between incentives to innovate for
the rm and for a social planner. For example, if the innovative rm could launch a drug
through a deterministic process then it would have an incentive to choose a drug with a
higher quality but the same horizontal characteristic as the pioneering drug. In fact, if the
new drug were available at no cost (or at a low cost), the optimal drug for rm 1 would
15Figure 3 only represents the comparative statics for drugs on the right-hand side of x0; for those
drugs on the left-hand side of x0 the comparative statics are similar. Moreover, the gure does not point
out the e¤ects that are zero. For example, in Region c, CS is independent of y and the gure does
not include information about the behavior of CS with respect to y in that region.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics and most preferred drugs in the drug space (x; h):
be O1 = (x0; htop) in Figure 3, where htop is the highest possible quality. In contrast,
consumers prefer drugs that are horizontally di¤erentiated from the pioneering drug. In
terms of consumer surplus, the optimal drug would be OCS, the farthest from x0 in the
horizontal dimension and at the border of Region c. Finally, if we dene the increase in
social welfare as the sum of rm 1s prots and the increase in the health system surplus,16
that is, W  1 +CS, then balancing both rm and consumer interests, the optimal
drug from a total welfare point of view would be OW in Figure 3. The drug OW improves
upon the pioneering drug as much as possible in the vertical dimension and it is also
horizontally di¤erentiated from the pioneering drug, although the optimal di¤erentiation
is far from the maximal. In fact, the drug OW would be horizontally located at 1=2 since
this is the drug type that minimizes the side-e¤ects of the whole population of patients.
7 A Model of Pharmaceutical Innovation
In this section we analyze the rst stage of our game, the innovation stage, where rm
1 chooses its R&D investment to maximize its expected prot. The innovation strategy
of the rm involves both the type of innovative process that it wants to adopt and the
level of the resources invested in that process. We now describe a typology of drugs and
16We have assumed that the pioneering drug is sold at its marginal cost. Thus, the rm (or any of the
rms) selling drug 0 always has zero prots.
16
innovation processes and then discuss the rms innovation decision.
7.1 Me-Too versus Breakthrough Drugs
In the pharmaceutical industry, a crucial distinction is made between me-too and break-
through innovations. The traditional distinction between these two types of innovation
relies on the mechanism of the action of the drugs. However, several voices in the phar-
maceutical industry have called for the adoption of a broader perspective when evaluating
innovation in medicines.17 Our interpretation is that the di¤erence between me-too and
breakthrough innovations rests on the distance between the new drug and the pioneer at
either the horizontal axis and/or the vertical one. A me-too innovation represents a small
change for some (or all) patients either in terms of quality of treatment, cost savings or
side e¤ects. For example, a me-too innovation may open the possibility of administering
smaller or fewer doses, or it might imply a slightly less invasive delivery (which we inter-
pret as a small increase in y).18 A me-too innovation may also cause slightly lower side
e¤ects for a subpopulation of patients (a small change in x).19 In contrast, a breakthrough
innovation ensures a signicant increase in the quality of the new drug or a drug whose
characteristics make it well-suited to patients who could not be well treated under the
existing treatment.20
7.2 Incremental versus Radical Innovation Processes
A rm seeking a me-too or a breakthrough innovation would rely on di¤erent processes.
In this sense, we dene an incremental innovation process as a process aiming at a me-
too innovation with respect to the existing drug.21 Similarly, when the process pursues
a signicant improvement (for all or a subpopulation of patients), or a substantial cost
reduction as compared to the old drug, then we say that the innovation process is radical.
17See the report by Mestre-Ferrandiz, Mordoh, and Sussex (2012) for a thorough discussion of the
nature of innovation in medicines.
18Insulin pens, for instance, are minimally invasive and have largely superseded the conventional insulin
syringe.
19The antihistamine Clarinex (desloratidine), for instance, is a small variation of Claritin (loratidine)
that has lower side e¤ects for those people with severe allergies and/or accompanying chronic respiratory
problems.
20For instance, Prilosep, based on the rst proton pump inhibitor (omeprazole), was considered a
breakthrough. It proved to be more e¤ective than histamine-2 receptor antagonists to the management
of peptic ulcer diseases.
21Sometimes, follow-on drugs are simply the natural outcome of simultaneous research programs into
the same therapeutic target (diMasi and Paquette, 2004). In other cases, they are the result of an
intentionally imitative research program (Garnier, 2008). The approach adopted in this paper is best
suited to this second view of the innovation process.
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Formally, an incremental innovation process (which we will denote by the sub-index in)
pursues a drug with a small x or y whereas a radical innovation process (denoted by
the sub-index ra) aims at a drug with a large x and/or y.
7.3 A Simple Model of Innovation
In this subsection we propose a highly stylized model of R&D investment with uncertainty.
We assume that the result of the innovation process is uncertain and its outcome can only
be poorly predicted, if at all. The uncertainty is greater for groundbreaking processes.
There are two types of innovation strategies available to the pharmaceutical rm. An
incremental innovation process can lead to a drug that is similar to the pioneering drug,
in the sense that it would have the same horizontal (or vertical) characteristic, that is,
x1 = x0 (or y1 = y0) and a minor improvement in quality (or small di¤erences in side
e¤ects).22 On the other hand, a radical innovation process results, in the case of success, in
a drug (x1; y1) where y1 is random but higher than y0 and x1 is also random. This reects
the idea that the innovative process represents a signicant departure from the old drug.
Moreover, the side e¤ects may also be very di¤erent from those of the pioneering drug. We
depict the two categories of processes in Figure 4.23 The crucial di¤erences between the
two categories of processes is that the distribution of the outcome of a radical innovation
process takes values on a large support and has a greater variance, which leads to higher
chances of getting a breakthrough drug (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2007; Singh and
Fleming, 2010).
Let us rst consider incremental innovation processes. If an investment I is realized
then there is a probability qin(I), increasing in I, of obtaining an innovation, while no
drug is obtained with probability 1   qin(I). If it is a vertical innovation process then,
in the case of success, the new drug has characteristics (x1; y1), with x1 = x0 and y1
is distributed according to the density function fin(y1) that takes values in the interval
[y0   ver; y0 + ver] ; where ver and ver are small (in the sense that the new drug cannot
be much more cost-e¤ective than the pioneer). Thus, for all I invested in a vertical
22Sometimes the incremental innovation process is developed by the same rm that holds the patent
for the pioneering drug in order to better compete with those rms o¤ering generic versions of the drug
once the patent has expired. Examples are Prilosec and Nexium, aimed at decreasing the amount of acid
produced in the stomach. In 2001 the patent for Prilosec (which has omeprazole as an active ingredient),
owned by AstraZeneca, expired and several generic versions of omeprazole entered the market. The
same year, Nexium, whose active ingredient is esomeprazole (a version of omeprazole whose molecular
orientation is left-handed), was also patented by AstraZeneca (our rm 1).
23Note that our innovation process in the vertical dimension di¤ers notably from the vertical innovation
analyzed by Bardey et al. (2010), where a vertical innovation is always synonymous with a breakthrough
innovation.
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Figure 4: Incremental and radical innovation processes.
incremental innovation process, expected private prots in(I) and social welfare Win(I)
are
in(I) = qin(I)
Z
[y0 ver;y0+ver]
1(x = x0; y)fin(y)dy;
Win(I) = qin(I)
Z
[y0 ver;y0+ver]
 
1(x = x0; y) + CS(x = x0; y)

fin(y)dy,
where 1(x; y) and CS(x; y) denote the rm 1s prots and the increase in consumer
surplus when the new drug has characteristics (x; y).
The expressions for prots and social welfare are similar for horizontal incremental
processes. In this case, the R&D investment leads, in the case of success, to a drug
(x1; y1) with y1 = y0 and x1 is distributed according to a density function hin(x) that
takes values in the interval [x0   hor; x0 + hor] ; where hor and hor are positive and
small (in the sense that the new drug would be suitable for similar types of patient than
the pioneer drug).
Proposition 3 compares private and social incentives to adopt an incremental innova-
tion process.
Proposition 3 For an incremental innovation process pursuing a me-too drug, the opti-
mal investment decision for rm 1; I1in; and for the social planner, I

in; coincide: I
1
in = I

in.
The intuition for this result derives from the fact that, for drugs close to the pioneering
drug, the innovative rm is always able to extract all the health system surplus. Consider
a vertical innovation process. If it is successful and the drug has a characteristic y1 > y0,
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rm 1 gets some monopoly power because the new drug lies in Region c. The rm will
impact all the extra quality of the drug into a higher price and it is able to extract all the
health system surplus (CS = 0 in Region c when x = 0). As the health system never
benets from the new drug, social and private incentives to innovate coincide as do their
optimal investment levels. The intuition for the horizontal incremental process is similar:
when the realization of ~x1 is close to x0; rm 1 sets the maximum price that the health
authority is willing to pay and it extracts all the surplus (CS = 0).
We now consider a radical process. If an investment I is made then there is a prob-
ability qra(I), increasing in I, of success at getting a new drug (x1; y1).24 If the process
is successful, the new drug has characteristics (x1; y1), where y1 takes values in the inter-
val [y0 + ; y0 + ] and x1 takes values in the interval [0; 1] ; where  can be positive or
negative,  is positive,  <  and (x1; y1) is distributed according to a density function
fra(x
1; y1).25 Therefore, expected private and social benets for each level of investment
I in a radical innovation process are
ra(I) = qra(I)
Z
[0;1]
Z
[y0+;y0+]
1(x1; y1)fra(x
1; y1)dy1dx1
and
Wra(I) = qra(I)
Z
[0;1]
Z
[y0+;y0+]
 
1(x1; y1) + CS(x1; y1)

fra(x
1; y1)dy1dx1:
Proposition 4 states the di¤erence between private and social incentives to invest in a
radical innovation process.
Proposition 4 For a radical innovation process pursuing a breakthrough drug the optimal
investment decision for rm 1; I1ra; is smaller than that for the social planner, I

ra: I
1
ra <
Ira.
A radical innovation process leads, with a certain probability, to a drug that improves
the health system surplus. First, the health system benets when the process is successful
if the new drug lies in Region c and x1 6= x0. In this case, the innovative rm cannot
appropriate all the surplus: at the maximum price at which it can serve all the market
(pall), some patients are strictly better-o¤ with the new drug than with the pioneer.
Similarly, if the successful process leads to a drug in Region b.ii then the interior price
pint allows the health system to benet. A social planner would also take into account
24Typically, qra(I) would be (much) lower than qin(I) for any I:
25The function fra(x1; y1) may not take values for some intervals of characteristics. Figure 4, for
instance, illustrates a process that never leads to very extreme drugs on the horizontal axis. In this
gure,  > 0 but this is not necessary in general.
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this surplus that the rm cannot extract from the health system and it would choose a
higher investment level than the rm.
As shown in propositions 3 and 4, the rm fully appropriates all the benets derived
from me-too drugs, whereas the health system can appropriate some surplus if a radical
innovation process goes successfully. Proposition 5 uses these results to state the main
policy implication of our analysis of the innovation incentives.
Proposition 5 If rm 1 can only adopt one category of innovation process (due, for
instance, to nancial or capacity constraints) then:
(i) There are cases where rm 1 prefers to adopt an incremental innovation process
whereas the social welfare is larger when adopting a radical innovation process.
(ii) There is no case where rm 1 prefers to adopt a radical innovation process whereas
adopting an incremental innovation process would generate a higher welfare.
Proposition 5 provides some theoretical support to the social concern that pharma-
ceutical rms devote too many resources to market me-too drugs and too few to launch
breakthrough drugs. Our model suggests that this disalignment between private and so-
cial incentives is due to the lack of private incentives to pursue radical innovations. While
private and social incentives to devote resources to pursue me-too drugs are aligned be-
cause the rm is able to appropriate all the benets through the price, this is not true for
rst-in-class drugs. In the latter case, the rm sets a price for the new drug which is low
enough to serve all (or a good part of) the market and the consumers benet from it.
8 The Physician is a Perfect Agent for the Patients
In the previous sections we have assumed that the demand for the drugs is decided by a
physician who prescribes the drug that provides the highest benet to the whole health
system. In this section we discuss the robustness of the results when the physician acts as
a perfect agent for the patients, prescribing the drug that maximizes the patientsutility.
Thus, the physician does not consider the whole cost of the drugs; he only internalizes the
cost disbursed by the patient.26 We analyze two di¤erent reimbursement regimes: one in
which patients pay a proportion of the price of the drugs not covered by health insurance
(that is, there is a copayment), and a second one in which the old drug is fully nanced
by the health authority while the new one is not covered by health insurance.
26If the physician makes choices considering patient utility and health authority costs then we would be
in the framework analyzed in the previous sections: the physician internalizes the whole price, regardless
of whether they are paid by the health authority or by the patients themselves.
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8.1 Patient Cost-Sharing of the Drugs
Suppose that there is a copayment  2 (0; 1] so that patients are required to pay p if the
price of the drug is p. Then, the benet to the health system of treating patient x with
drug (x^; h^) and paying price p^ for this drug is H(x; x^; h^; p^) while patientsutility, which
determines the physicians prescription of drugs, is
U(x; x^; h^; p^)  b

h^  l jx^  xj

  p^ = 

b


h^  l jx^  xj

  p^

:
If the physician follows the function U(x; x^; h^; p^) instead of H(x; x^; h^; p^) to make his
choices, then all the results concerning physician prescription choices and rm 1s pricing
decisions for the case  = 1 (Proposition 1) would remain valid for any  by replacing, in
the expressions of pmax, pall, and pint, the parameter b by b

. That is, the results in a model
where patients pay a proportion of the prices are similar to those in a model without
copayment where the marginal utility of being healthy is higher. Since sign

@p1
@

=
 sign

@p1
@b

, and pmax, pall, and pint are all increasing in b, the price of the new drug will
be higher the lower the copayment .27
In order to examine the results more deeply we need to distinguish two cases. In
the case c1 = c0 (i.e., c = 0), the regions in the drug space depicted in Figure 2 are
independent of the parameter b. Therefore, at the optimal prices, the new and the old
drugs are prescribed to the same patients for any value of , although the price for drug
1 is larger as  decreases. This implies that, for c = 0, an increase in the copayment
(that is, a decrease in ) leads to a lower benet to the health system and to a higher
prot to rm 1. However, such increase in the copayment has no impact on total welfare
because changes in  only induce changes in the monetary transfers between the health
system and the innovative rm. Thus, the optimal drug for rm 1 would still be O1 (see
Figure 3), the drug OW would still be optimal from a total welfare point of view (dened
as the sum of the benets of the health system and rm 1s prots), and the point OCS
would correspond to the optimal drug for the patient (that is, the drug that maximizes
the function U).
In the case c1 > c0 (c > 0), the borders of the regions in Figure 2 shift vertically
down, and the new drug is prescribed to more patients with than without copayment.
Here, the increase in the monetary transfer from the health authority to rm 1 due to
the copayment comes combined with a misallocation of drugs from the health system
27This extension also corresponds to the case where there is no copayment but the physician gives
di¤erent weights to the patient health (a weight of 1) and to the drugsprice (a weight of a). Equivalently,
the model corresponds to a situation where the physician takes into account both the patientsutility
and the prots of the health authority and puts less weight on the second term.
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perspective. The location of the optimal drugs O1, OW , and OCS in the drug space would
be the same as in the case c = 0 when Figure 3 is drawn using the new (shifted-down)
borders.
Finally, given that equilibrium prices are higher when the physician is a perfect agent
for patients subject to copayment than when he is a perfect agent for the health system,
the prots of the innovative rm are higher: the three functions 1(pmax), 1(pint); and
1(pall) are linear in b; hence, they increase as  decreases. Therefore, rm 1s incentives
to innovate are also higher. This result holds both for incremental and radical innovation
processes. When c = 0, the regions in Figure 2 do not vary with  and, given the
linearity of the prot functions in b, the trade-o¤ between the two types of processes is
una¤ected: the rm has relatively too many incentives to pursue an incremental rather
than a radical innovation process. If c > 0, low values of  imply that drugs close to the
pioneer (in terms of h and x) that would not have been marketed without copayments
are now prescribed. Therefore, rm 1 has a stronger incentive to develop drugs whose
additional therapeutic value is low, which suggests that it is yet more inclined to devote
resources to incremental rather than to radical innovation processes.
8.2 The New Drug is Not Subsidized
Suppose now that the health authority only covers the old drug, so that patients have to
pay the full price of the new one, should it be prescribed. Thus, patientsutility when
treated with the old drug is
U(x;x0; h0; 0) = b
 
h0   l x0   x ;
while it takes the form
U(x;x1; h1; p1) = b
 
h1   l x1   x  p1
when patients are prescribed the new drug. Then, physician prescription choices and
pricing decisions by the rm are obtained by considering the analysis conducted in the
previous sections for the particular case c0 = 0: Both the physician and the rm behave
as if the price of the pioneering drug were 0. Since pmax, pall, and pint are all decreasing in
c0, rm 1 is induced to choose lower prices than in our initial model. Moreover, looking at
Figure 2, reductions in c0 make the borders of the regions shift vertically up and, at the
optimal prices, the new drug is prescribed to fewer patients as compared to the situation
in which the cost of the pioneering drug is also taken into account. Thus, in this case, the
rm obtains lower prots and it has lower incentives to innovate. However, its relative
incentives to adopt radical innovation processes are now larger because me-too drugs do
not provide any prots.
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9 Conclusion
The proliferation of follow-on drugs is nowadays the subject of some debate. Proponents
of follow-on drugs highlight that some of them are therapeutically superior to the pioneer.
Moreover, patients and physicians benet from the access to a larger pool of therapeutic
choices. But there are also voices warning that imitative drug development poses a threat,
as it could reduce the incentive for rms to develop rst-in-class drugs.
This paper seeks to contribute to this social debate. We have constructed a simple
model where drugs are vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated. After studying the opti-
mal price decision of a rm introducing a new drug, we have analyzed the rm incentives
to invest in R&D when a pioneer drug is already on the market. In particular, we have
disentangled the quest for breakthrough drugs from the search of follow-on drugs. In our
model, both breakthrough and follow-on drugs are socially valuable.
While private and social incentives to invest in R&D processes coincide for incremental
innovation ventures, private incentives are lower than social ones when the process is rad-
ical. Moreover, we interestingly nd that pharmaceutical rms are too prone to devoting
resources (if scarce) to pursue incremental innovation processes so as to fully appropriate
all the benets derived from me-too drugs. Thus, these results somehow reproduce the
social concern that the main problem regarding the rapid increase of me-too drugs is that
they diminish the incentives for innovation in pioneering drugs.
Our conclusions are obtained under some simplifying assumptions; we now discuss
some of them. First, we have assumed that the pioneering drug is sold on the market at
its marginal price. This hypothesis ts well in markets where the patent for the pioneering
drug has already expired and several generic drugs have been introduced. However, there
are other markets where the pioneering drug is sold by one rm at a price over its marginal
cost. In such cases, the incumbent rm may react to the launch of a new drug by reducing
the price of its drug. Price competition between the two rms will be ercer the lower
the horizontal distance between the two drugs. This seems to suggest that under price
competition the incentives of the innovative rm to di¤erentiate itself in the horizontal axis
increase, which may translate into more incentives to adopt radical innovation processes.
In addition to this, if the patent covering the pioneering drug has not expired yet, an
incremental innovation would be more likely to infringe on the patent than a radical one,
which would further increase the rms incentives to invest in radical innovations.
Secondly, our innovative rm freely chooses the price of the new drug. However, reg-
ulations worldwide to control excessive market power of pharmaceutical rms abound. It
would be worth investigating whether price regulations (such as price ceilings or reference
prices) would be an e¤ective tool to align the incentives of the rm and the society. Price
ceilings in our model, for instance, would undermine private incentives to innovate. Given
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that the di¤erence in prices between the new and the pioneering drugs is higher for radical
than for incremental innovations, the price ceilings should have a larger negative impact
on radical than on incremental processes. Our analysis also suggests that price ceilings
would have a larger impact on vertical rather than on horizontal innovations. Since verti-
cal improvements allow the pharmaceutical rm to charge higher prices, the rm will be
more constrained by the regulated price if it launches a new drug that is an improvement
over the pioneer in the vertical dimension. Regarding reference prices, the restriction on
prices might concern only those drugs that are close to the pioneer. In that case, the
incentives for radical innovations may be less a¤ected by the regulation than those for
incremental innovations as more di¤erentiated new drugs manage to charge a larger price
and obtain higher prots.
Third, our results have been obtained under the assumption of risk neutrality for all
the players involved. However, it is natural to think that pharmaceutical rms exhibit a
certain degree of risk aversion. If we relax the risk neutrality assumption to accommodate
more realism, our main result would be reinforced as risk aversion would make rms even
more prone to adopt (safer) incremental innovations.
Finally, in our model there is only one innovative rm so we have not considered com-
petition in research (in Bardey et al., 2010, several laboratories compete in the research
sector of the pharmaceutical industry). If rms compete in adopting incremental innova-
tion processes, they will overinvest in comparison to the socially e¢ cient level, leading to
more me-too drugs than the socially optimal number. At the same time, the innovative
rm will also increase its investment in radical innovation processes under the pressure
of competition. And this could lead to investment levels closer to the socially optimal
one. Thus, if rms compete in research, the result that they devote too many resources
to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations still holds.
In this paper, we have identied a problem of misalignment between private and so-
cial incentives to innovate that results in a bias toward me-too drugs. A more normative
analysis, in which di¤erent solutions to the problem can be addressed, is left for further
research. Such policies could include direct R&D tax incentives, nonprot tax exemp-
tions for research institutions, public nancing of R&D activity, as well as many other
instruments that attempt to stimulate various forms of research and innovative activity.
Our analysis suggests that the optimal R&D policy should focus on providing incentives
for radical innovation ventures.
Finally, although there seems to be a great social awareness of the proliferation of
me-too drugs, to date, economists have done little theoretical research on this issue. We
hope that this study opens the door to further research into that area and that it will
also stimulate the ongoing debate over the excessive launching of me-too drugs.
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10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We distinguish three zones of parameters: c1  pmax;
c1 2  pall; pmax, and c1  pall. We note that c1  pmax if and only if c  b(lx +h),
i.e., y   lx. Similarly, c1  pall if and only if c  b(h   lx), i.e., y  lx. We
analyze the optimal rms pricing in the three zones.
Zoney  lx: Given that c1  pmax, there is no price above marginal cost at which
the physician prescribes the new drug to some patients. Therefore, the best strategy for
rm 1 is to not sell its drug.
Zone y2 ( lx; lx) : In this zone, c1 > pall and rm 1 cannot select a price at
which it makes a prot by selling to all the patients. If x1 > x0, the rm chooses the price
p1 that maximizes its prots, taking into account that its drug will be prescribed to those
patients with characteristic x 2 [~x; 1). Hence, p1 2 [c1; pmax] maximizes
1(p1) = (p1   c1) (1  ~x) = (p1   c1)

1  x0   (lx  h)
2l
  (p
1   c0)
2bl

:
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We write the expression for the prots as
1(p1) = (p1   c1)

M   (lx  h)
2l
  (p
1   c0)
2bl

,
which is also valid for the situation where x1 < x0 (if x1 = x0, this zone is empty).28
The rst-order and second-order conditions are
1p1(p
1) =M   (lx  h)
2l
  (2p
1   (c0 + c1))
2bl
;
1p1p1(p
1) =
 1
bl
< 0:
The interior candidate to solution p1 satises 1p1(p
1) = 0 and is given by
p1 = p
int =
1
2
 
c0 + c1

+ blM   1
2
b(lx  h):
The concavity of the function 1(p1;x;h) implies that the candidate pint is the
optimum if and only if it lies in the interval [c1; pmax]. First, pint > c1 if and only if
1
2
c + blM   1
2
b(lx  h) > 0,
that is, y > lx   2lM . Given that M  x, the previous inequality is implied by
y >  lx, which is satised in this zone. Second, pint < pmax = c0+ b(lx+h) if and
only if
1
2
c + blM   1
2
b(lx  h) < b(lx +h),
from which it easily follows that pint < pmax if and only ifM < 1
2l
(3lx +y). Therefore,
in this zone, p1 = pint if M < 1
2l
(3lx +y) and p1 = pmax otherwise (p1 = c cannot be
optimal because prots would be zero).
Zoney lx: In this zone, rm 1 can set the price pall that would allow it to attract
all patients in [0; 1] : It can also choose any price in the interval p1 2  pall; pmax, in which
case the new drug will be prescribed to a subset of the patients. In this interval, the
interior candidate to solution is pint, as in the previous zone. We check the conditions
under which pint 2  pall; pmax.
First, pint > pall if and only if 1
2
(c0 + c1) + blM   1
2
b(lx  h) > c0 + b(h   lx);
that is,
M >
1
2l
(y   lx):
28If x1 < x0, then
~x = x0   (lx  h)
2l
 
 
p1   c0
2bl
=M   (lx  h)
2l
 
 
p1   c0
2bl
:
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Note that at p1 = pint, rm 1 serves a market of size M . However, this cannot be the
best pricing strategy for the rm because it can serve the whole market and obtain larger
prots by marginally decreasing the price. Therefore, if M  1
2l
(y   lx), setting the
price pall and serving the whole market is certainly the optimal decision.
Second, as we show in the analysis of Zone y 2 ( lx; lx), pint  pmax if and only
if M  1
2l
(3lx +y).
Thus, for M  1
2l
(3lx +y) ; the candidates for solution are pmax and pall; for
M 2   1
2l
(y   lx); 12l (3lx +y)

the candidates for solution are pint and pall; and for
M  1
2l
(y   lx), the optimal price is pall.
We now analyze the conditions for1(pmax)  1(pall), that is, b (M  x) (y + lx) 
b(y   lx), or
y  (1 +M  x)
(1 M +x) lx = lg (x) :
We note that the border y = lg (x) always lies in the zone y  lx, because by  
blg (x)  b (y   lx) if and only if g (x)  x, which is equivalent to (1+M x)(1 M+x)  1,
or M  x, which holds.
Similarly, 1(pint)  1(pall) if and only if b
2l
 
lM + 1
2
(y   lx)
2  b(y   lx)
that, denoting t  (y   lx), can be written as
 
lM + 1
2
t
2   2lt  0, that is,
f(t) 

t  2l

2 M + 2p1 M

t  2l

2 M   2p1 M

 0:
We are interested in the cases where M > 1
2l
(y   lx) (because pall is certainly optimal
otherwise), that is, t < 2lM . The function f(t) satises f(0) > 0: Moreover, f(2lM) < 0.
Therefore, f(t)  0 if and only if t is lower than the rst root, that is, y   lx 
2l
 
2 M   2p1 M, or
y  lx + 2l

2 M   2p1 M

= lg (x) :
We note that the change in the denition of the function g (x) happens at the point
where M = 1
2l
(y + 3lx) (which separates the regions where either pint or pmax are
candidates). Then, the value x where the change happens is the solution of the following
system of equations (in x and h):
M =
1
2l
(y + 3lx)
y = lx + 2l

2 M   2p1 M

that is,
x =
p
1 M   (1 M) ;
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which is a positive value. The function g (x), as it is dened in the main text just before
Proposition 1, is continuous because it is continuous at the point
p
1 M  (1 M), and
it is also continuously di¤erentiable.
Once we have analyzed the optimal price in each of the three zones, it easily follows
that the solution is continuous, in the sense that if the optimal price is pall (resp. pmax)
in the second zone, then it is also optimal if we decrease c and enter the third zone.
Therefore, the optimal rm 1s pricing policy is the one described in the proposition.
Finally, it is easy to check that the prots are continuous: (a) over the line y =
2lM   3lx, we have 1(pmax) = 1(pint): (b) If the condition y = lg (x) holds
we have two cases: (b.1) For g(x)  (1+M x)(1 M+x)x, 1(pall) = 1(pmax) and (b.2) for
g(x)  x + 2
 
2 M   2p1 M, then 1(pall) = 1(pint).
Proof of Corollary 1. We denote 1(x;y) the rm 1s prots as a function of
x and y.
In Region b.i, where p1 = pmax:
1y(x;y) = b (M  x) > 0; 1yy(x;y) = 0:
1x(x;y) = b (lM   (2lx +y)), which is positive for y =  lx and negative
for y = 2lM   3lx; 1xx(x;y) =  2bl < 0:
In Region b.ii, where p1 = pint:
1y(x;y) =
b
4l
(2lM +y   lx) > 0; 1yy(x;y) = bl4 > 0:
1x(x;y) =   b4 (2lM +y   lx) < 0; 1xx(x;y) = bl4 > 0:
In Region c, where p1 = pall:
1y(x;y) = b > 0; 
1
yy
(x;y) = 0:
1x(x;y) =  lb < 0; 1xx(x;y) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. Proofs for Region a and Region b.i are immediate.
In Region b.ii the variation in health system surplus, that is, (in case x1  x0)29
the di¤erence for patients in [~x; 1] from being treated with drug (h0; x0) at price c0 and
being treated with drug (h1; x1) at price pint; is the sum of the area dened by a triangle
for [~x; x1] and the area dened by a rhomboid for [x1; 1]. For the patients in [~x; x1],
CS = 1
2
(x1   ~x (pint)) (bh1   pint   b (h0   l (x1   x0)) + c0) : Substituting ~x (pint) and
pint; we have
CS =
b
16l
(y + 3lx   2lM) .
For the patients in [x1; 1], CS = (1  x1) (bh1   pint   b (h0   l (x1   x0)) + c0) : Substi-
tuting pint and using (1  x1) = (M  x) ; we have
CS =
b
2
(M  x) (y + 3lx   2lM) .
29The case x1 < x0 is similar.
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Hence, adding both intervals, we obtain
CS(pint) =
b
16l
(y + 3lx   2lM) (y   5lx + 6lM) :
In Region c the variation in the health system surplus is similar to the one previously
analyzed, but taking into account that for pall (considering again that x1 > x0) patients
in [0; x0] have the same surplus as without the new drug. For the patients in [x0; x1],
CS =
1
2
 
x1   x0  bh1   pall   b  h0   l  x1   x0+ c0 :
Substituting pall we have
CS = bl2x.
For [x1; 1], CS = (1  x1)  bh1   pall   b (h0   l (x1   x0)) + c0 : Substituting pall and
using (1  x1) = (M  x) ;we obtain
CS = 2blx (M  x) :
Adding the two parts, we have
CS(pall) = blx (2M  x) :
Proof of Corollary 2. We denote CS(x;y) the variation in consumer surplus
as a function of x and y.
In Region a and Region b.i all the derivatives are zero.
In Region b.ii:
CSy(x;y) =
b
8l
(y   lx + 2lM) > b8l ( 2lx + 2Ml) > 0:
CSyy(x;y) =
b
8l
> 0:
CSx(x;y) =
1
8
( y   15lx + 14lM) : We note that, at M = 12l (y + 3lx) ;
CSx(x;y) =
3
4
(y + lx) > 0 because y >  lx. Moreover, CSx(x;y) <
1
8
( 14lx + 14lM) : Hence, CSx(x =M;y) < 0:
CSxx(x;y) =  158 bl < 0
In Region c:
CSy(x;y) = 0; CSyy(x;y) = 0:
CSx(x;y) = 2bl (M  x) > 0:
CSxx(x;y) =  2bl < 0:
Finally, the behavior of CS at the borders between regions follows from the behavior
of the optimal price p1 that we discussed following Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. In case of a successful project, the new drug (x = x0; y)
lies either in Region a (for y  y0) or Region c with x = x0 (for y > y0): In the rst
31
case (see Proposition 2), CS(x = x0; y) = CS(c1) = 0. In the second case, CS(x =
x0; y) = CS(pall) = blx (2M  x) = 0 because x = 0: Therefore, in(I) = Win(I)
for all I and the optimal investment levels for the two functions coincide.
The argument for a horizontal incremental innovation process is similar because the
new drug would lie in Region b.i where CS(x; y = y0) = CS(pmax) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. There is some positive probability that the new drug
(x1; y1) lies in Region c with x1 6= x0. Depending on the level of y1, there can also be a
positive probability that the new drug lies in Region b.ii). In both regions, CS(x; y1) >
0: Given that CS(x; y)  0 for every new drug, we have dra(I)
dI
< dWra(I)
dI
for every I,
which implies that I1ra < I

ra.
Proof of Proposition 5. Denoting by I1Z and I

Z for Z = in, ra the optimal level
of investment in a process of type Z for rm 1 and the social planner, respectively, then
in(I
1
in) = Win(I

in)
ra(I
1
ra) < Wra(I

ra):
It may happen that
Wra(I

ra) > Win(I

in) = in(I
1
in) > ra(I
1
ra)
but it can never be the case that
Wra(I

ra) < Win(I

in) = in(I
1
in) < ra(I
1
ra);
which implies the result.
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